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Rocky Mountain High: The Impact of Federal
Guidance to Banks on the Marijuana Industry
I. INTRODUCTION
A range of disparate viewpoints exists concerning the efficacy,
necessity and ethicality of the criminalization of marijuana in the United
States. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have legalized
the use of marijuana to some extent.1 Under federal law, the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”) prohibits the manufacturing, distribution or
dispensing of marijuana.2 Despite the CSA, figures in popular media
increasingly admit to and even boast about their “medical use”
(frequently treated as a political fiction) or recreational use of the
substance.3 With a majority of Americans now supporting legalization,4
the end to marijuana prohibition could become reality. Despite federal
law to the contrary, the states that have decriminalized or legalized
marijuana continue to see enormous growth in state-sanctioned
marijuana-businesses.5 These budding markets have contributed huge
revenues to the state coffers.6 However, until federal legislation steps in
to build a uniform regulatory structure concerning its use and
distribution, several sizeable hurdles remain for those businesses that
are legally permitted at the state level to trade grass for cash. One of the
1. Medical
Marijuana
Pros
and
Cons,
PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource. php?resourceID=000881 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2014).
2. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
3. 2013 Top 50 Most Influential Marijuana Users, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT,
http://www.mpp.org/outreach/top-50-marijuana-users-list.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
4. Art Swift, For the First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizingmarijuana.aspx.
5. Bill Briggs, Pot Legalizations Push U.S. Toward Weed Business Boom, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/legal-pot/pot-legalizations-push-u-scloser-weed-business-boom-n243861.
6. Patrick Johnsson, How Legal Marijuana is Reshaping State Economies, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2014/1107/Howlegal-marijuana-is-reshaping-state-economies-video; Aaron Smith, Colorado Stash: $184m
(Feb.
20,
2014,
2:25
PM),
in
Marijuana
Taxes,
CNN
MONEY
http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/20/news/economy/ marijuana-taxes-colorado/.
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most exigent of these hurdles is just that: cash. Financial institutions are
reluctant to deal with marijuana-related businesses because of the risk
of prosecution under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).7 Recent guidance
by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”)8 and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provides little relief from these risks.9
This Note considers the implications of these recent federal
guidelines issued to financial institutions with respect to their freedom
to do business with the state-sanctioned marijuana industry. It also
discusses whether viable legal alternatives might be available to allow
growth in the burgeoning marijuana markets while still remaining
faithful to the federal government’s position regarding marijuana as a
dangerous drug worthy of prohibition. This Note attempts to balance
competing economic and governmental interests in an emerging
industry that continues to evolve amid a tumultuous national landscape.
This Note argues that current guidelines are excessively onerous for
financial institutions and without greater flexibility, state-sanctioned
marijuana businesses will not have access to vital financial services.10
Furthermore, without some change in the existing structure, the
problems associated with all-cash businesses will continue for
marijuana businesses operating legally under state law.11 The exclusion
of valuable tax revenue from government coffers and investment capital
7. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (Bank Secrecy Act),
Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 202, 84 Stat. 1118, 1118 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5311
(2012)) (requiring banks and financial institutions to facilitate the detection and prevention
of money laundering); Reginald J. Brown et al., New Guidance on Financial Services and
HALE
(Feb.
20,
2014),
Marijuana-Related
Businesses,
WILMER
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=107374234
14.
8. “FinCEN is a bureau of the United States Department of the Treasury. FinCEN’s
mission is to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money laundering
and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.” What We Do, FINCEN.GOV
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/.
9. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE:
BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES (Feb. 14, 2014),
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf
[hereinafter FINCEN GUIDANCE].
10. See infra Parts III & IV.
11. See John B. Stephens, Pot Shops Shunned By Banks Haul in the Cash, USA TODAY
(Aug.
31,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/31/potmarijuana-industry/13628491/. Jennifer Waller, a Colorado Bankers Association senior
vice president, explains that the FinCEN guidance “just set up this compliance scheme that’s
impossible to follow and reiterated that you could still be prosecuted even if you’re doing
everything under the memo . . . .” Id.
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from the marketplace these businesses generate will also persist.12
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief
background on the recently issued FinCEN guidance concerning
provision of banking services to marijuana businesses.13 Part III
explains that the onus the guidance places on the banks essentially make
the formation of business relationships with marijuana businesses
impracticable.14 Part IV specifically discusses the requirement for
“suspicious activity reports” and the process that is involved in
submitting them to remain in compliance with FinCEN’s guidelines.15
Part V contemplates the problems inherent in “all cash” businesses—the
structure to which the state-legalized marijuana industry is relegated—
and how states have attempted to reduce some of these hazards in the
absence of large-scale offerings of financial services from depository
institutions.16 Finally, Part VI concludes with some possible legislative
solutions.17
II. BACKGROUND
Under the current federal regulatory scheme, marijuana qualifies
as a Schedule I substance with “no currently accepted medical use” and
a “high potential for abuse.”18 The conflict between state and federal
law on the subject represents a seemingly intractable federalism
problem in states where marijuana is legal.19 The official position of the
federal government conflicts with its willingness and ability to deploy
12. See Jacob Sullum, Marijuana Money Is Still a Pot of Trouble for Banks, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/09/18/localbanks-terrified-by-friendly-neighborhood-marijuana-merchants/ (explaining that the IRS
suggested, in a recent tax dispute, that marijuana businesses could pay taxes in cash through
indirect electronic methods—methods that may still qualify as money laundering).
13. See FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9; see also infra, Part II.
14. See infra, Part III.
15. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29,
2013) [hereinafter
Cole
Memo],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
(guidance
regarding marijuana enforcement); see infra Part IV.
16. Keith Coffman, Colorado Lawmakers OK Co-Op Banking Option for Marijuana
Sellers, REUTERS (May 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/08/us-usamarijuana-colorado-idUSBREA3M27X20140508; see infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG SCHEDULES (2014), available at
http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml.
19. See Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana at the Crossroads: Article: Medical Marijuana
and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 997 (2012).
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resources to enforce the prohibition of marijuana in states where it has
been legalized.20 The federal government must allocate its resources for
enforcement and prosecution under federal law to the most pressing
cases.21 While the federal ban on marijuana might prove to have bite in
individual cases, overall, it has proven “largely toothless” in curtailing
state regulations that contradict it.22 While direct regulation has not
proven to impede the progress of the state-sanctioned marijuana
businesses, indirect regulation is now proving effective.23 Specifically,
indirect regulation restricting access to banking presents a significant
burden for marijuana business owners.24 The most pressing problem in
the day-to-day lives of marijuana business owners is what to do with the
money.25 Without a uniform structure to rely on, banks have been more
than a little reluctant to provide financial services to marijuana
businesses for fear of federal prosecution.26
Until banks make a move toward opening their doors to
marijuana distributors and vendors, these entrepreneurs will be left to
manage large quantities of cash while also running businesses that were,
until very recently, criminal.27 Without a secure means to store and
make use of their income, proprietors of marijuana businesses remain
vulnerable to criminal threats.28 Without access to the banking and
financial system, the cash produced from the state-sanctioned marijuana
industry is unproductive, when it could be made to work for the good of
the economy at large if deposited into our financial system. Cash is
difficult to track, it earns no interest, it is problematic to invest, and it is
exceedingly difficult to accurately tax.29
Thus, the current state of affairs is a conflict between federal
and state law. The federal prohibition is rarely enforced against

20. Id.
21. Id. at 1003.
22. Id. at 998.
23. Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.

44 (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2).
24. Id.
25. See Stephens, supra note 11.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Matt Ferner, House Votes to Allow Banking Access for Marijuana Businesses,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/07/16/house-marijuana-banking_n_5592620.html.
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individuals that follow contradictory state law.30 In the midst of underenforcement, the federal government chooses to regulate the statesanctioned businesses indirectly through their access to financial
services.31 To soften the edges of these contradictions, however, the
federal government has indicated that it has certain priorities under the
CSA that it emphasizes for prosecution.32
On August 29, 2013, the Department of Justice issued guidance
to U.S. Attorneys (the “Cole Memo”) to use their enforcement resources
to prosecute marijuana violations of the CSA only when the conduct
interferes with one of the priorities identified.33 Deputy Attorney
General Cole issued “Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial
Crimes,” on February 14, 2014.34 The Deputy Attorney General
reiterated the Cole Memo Priorities and stated that in determining
whether to charge individuals or institutions with violations of the
money laundering statutes, the unlicensed money remitter statute, and
the BSA based on marijuana-related violations of the CSA, prosecutors
should also apply the Cole Memo Priorities.35 The same day, FinCEN
issued its own guidance detailing the prioritization of prosecutions of
offenses violating relevant federal banking law.36
While these efforts were intended to calm the banking system’s
anxiety over developing relationships with marijuana-related businesses
in those states with legalized marijuana, none of this guidance provided
comfort to financial institutions in dealing with the newly-legalized
businesses.37 Larger banks are unwilling to expose themselves to the
risks attached to the marijuana business despite federal assurances that
they will avoid prosecution if they comply with the relevant
guidelines.38 Smaller banks, while on the whole adopting a similar
stance to their larger counterparts, will occasionally form working
relationships with marijuana businesses in accordance with the
Hill, supra note 23, at 2.
Id.
See Cole Memo, supra note 14, at 1.
Id.; see infra Part III.
Cole Memo, supra note 14, at 1.
Cole Memo, supra note 14, at 4.
See FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9.
Serge F. Kovaleski, U.S. Issues Marijuana Guidelines for Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/us/us-issues-marijuana-guidelines-forbanks.html?_r=0.
38. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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procedures set out by FinCEN.39 However, these relationships may
result in the larger banks becoming exposed to the risks associated with
marijuana businesses through their relationships with these smaller
institutions.40 To increase the banks’ comfort level with forming
relationships with marijuana businesses, there is a need for greater
clarity and a regulatory structure that all financial institutions can make
workable.41 The current guidelines do not provide the assurances or
comprehensive procedures that practically all banks view as a necessary
prerequisite to doing business with the marijuana industry.42
III. “MORE WHAT YOU’D CALL GUIDELINES THAN ACTUAL RULES”
In Disney’s 2003 film Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of
the Black Pearl, one of the most famous scenes contains an exchange
between Elizabeth Swann, an English aristocrat, and Hector Barbossa,
captain of a cursed pirating vessel, the eponymous “Black Pearl.”43
Swann negotiates with the pirates, led by Barbossa, who are in the
process of laying siege to the city of Port Royal, over which Swann’s
father is governor.44 As they make preparations to leave, Swann
demands to be returned to the shore and attempts to invoke the “Pirate
Code” to support her demand.45 Barbossa turns on her and replies,
“First, your return to shore was not a part of our negotiations, nor our
agreement, so I must do nothing. And secondly, you must be a pirate
for the pirate code to apply, and you’re not. And thirdly, the Code is
more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than actual rules. Welcome aboard

39. See Danielle Douglas, Banks Are Slowly Welcoming Legal Marijuana Dealers,
WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/banksare-slowly-welcoming-legal-marijuana-dealers/2014/08/12/01c17960-225b-11e4-8593da634b334390_story.html (explaining that, at the time this article was written, 105 banks
had established relationships with marijuana-related businesses).
40. Brett Wolf, Big U.S. Banks Seek New Clarity on Risks of Marijuana-Linked
Accounts, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/us-banksmoneylaundering-drugs-idUSKBN0GS2QB20140828.
41. See Travis Nelson, Banks Are Dazed and Confused After Marijuana Guidance,
LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/514588/banks-are-dazed-andconfused-after-marijuana-guidance.
42. Kovaleski, supra note 37.
43. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney
Pictures 2003).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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the Black Pearl . . . .”46
The same scenario faces the banking institutions from FinCEN’s
“guidance” issued in 2014 for the provision of financial services to
state-sanctioned marijuana businesses.47 Under the current structure,
the guidance issued by FinCEN and the DOJ offers no substantial
protections against the prohibitions of the BSA or marijuana
enforcement under the CSA.48 Instead, the guidance only provides a
“deprioritization” of prosecutions relating to the provision of financial
services to state-sanctioned marijuana businesses so long as the
financial entities conform to the outlined procedures.49 Without more
substantial protections, banks that comply with the guidance may still
be found in violation of money laundering statutes and may be
prosecuted by the DOJ.50 In effect, a bank that attempts to invoke the
FinCEN guidance may find immunity from prosecution excluded from
its “negotiations,” or “agreement” with FinCEN and that the guidance
operates as “guidelines” rather than rules that shield banks from
penalties.
The penalties facing banks include those contained in money
laundering statutes. The “relevant provision of the Money Laundering
Control Act reads,
[w]hoever, knowing that the property involved in a
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity—
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity. . . shall be sentenced to a

Id.
Editorial, Feds Drag Feet on Banking Access for Marijuana Industry, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2014, at A9.
48. See Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2 (explaining that it is the customary practice of
the DOJ to leave localized enforcement to local authorities when activity does not violate
one of the stated priorities, but does not directly state that it will not exercise its prerogative
to prosecute); see also FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 2 (stating only that FinCEN
should “consider these enforcement priorities with respect to federal money laundering,
unlicensed money transmitter, and BSA offenses predicated on marijuana-related violations
of the CSA”).
49. Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2.
50. Id.
46.
47.
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fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the
property involved in the transaction, whichever is
greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
or both.51
At the federal level, proceeds from marijuana businesses still
represent “proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.”52 Simply put,
income generated by state-sanctioned marijuana businesses is, in the
eyes of the federal government, ill-gotten gains.53 Such income and
profits derived from businesses generating it are subject to the penalties
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, which forbid “[e]ngaging in monetary
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity.”54
The FinCEN guidance and the Cole Memo, issued to allow
banks some freedom to deal specifically with businesses legalized under
state law, did not remove this danger.55 Rather, the Cole Memo outlines
a list of priorities for prosecution of marijuana-related crimes and
instructs DOJ attorneys and law enforcement, that whether marijuanarelated conduct violates one of these priorities should be instructive
when considering prosecution.56
The Cole Memo priorities include:
(1) Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
(2) Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from
going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3)
Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where
it is legal under state law in some form to other states;
(4) Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from
being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of
other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; (5)
Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6) Preventing
drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse
51. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a)(1), 100
Stat. 3207, 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1) (West 2013)).
52. Id.
53. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012).
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957.
55. Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2.
56. Id.
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public health consequences associated with marijuana
use; (7) Preventing the growing of marijuana on public
lands and the attendant public safety and environmental
dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands;
and (8) Preventing marijuana possession or use on
federal property.57
Essentially, the guidance only provides that if the Cole Memo
Priorities are not implicated in the course of a financial institution’s
activities relating to a marijuana business, “prosecution may not be
‘appropriate.’ ”58 This language is far too tepid to offer banks any
assurance that they will evade federal criminal prosecution if they
provide financial services to a marijuana business.59 The guidance also
fails to provide any incentive to offer basic financial services to
marijuana businesses.60 The FinCEN guidance, predicated on the Cole
Memo, offers neither a firm guarantee of protection from prosecution
nor a firm prohibition against federal retribution.61 The Cole Memo and
the FinCEN guidance state that, although the DOJ and FinCEN do not
wish to use their discretion to allocate their resources to the prosecution
of banks serving businesses that are considered legal in their state, it
does not prevent them from doing so.62 In accordance with this weak
assurance, most banks have erred on the side of caution and refused to
offer services to marijuana businesses.63
Some smaller banks have voluntarily established relationships
with state-sanctioned marijuana businesses, but the rate at which these
relationships terminate appears to overshadow any such progress.64 The
Id.
Kovaleski, supra note 37.
Id; see also Editorial, supra note 47 (statement of Don Childears, president of the
Colorado Bankers Association) (“After a series of red lights, we expected this guidance to
be a yellow one. This isn’t close to that.”).
60. Id.
61. See Nelson, supra note 41 (quoting the American Bankers Association) (“Because
marijuana is illegal under federal statute, guidance alone isn’t enough. There’s a great deal
of guidance that banks would want to see in terms of banking with these types of businesses
but guidance alone doesn’t change the fundamental prohibition.”).
62. Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2.
63. Stephens, supra note 11. (“ ‘The media was saying it was a green light,’ said
Jenifer Waller, a Colorado Bankers Association senior vice president. ‘We said, “No, it
continues to be a very solid red light; not even yellow, to be honest.” ’ ”).
64. See Bruce Krasnow, New Banking Rules Create Tough Barriers for State’s
Growing Medical Pot Businesses,
INSURANCENEWS.NET (Oct. 19, 2014),
57.
58.
59.
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willingness of smaller depository institutions to bear the risk presented
by the possibility of federal prosecution causes headaches for the larger
institutions that are not offering their services to marijuana businesses.65
For example, the entanglement of funds traceable to sources within the
state-sanctioned marijuana industry as they move from smaller banks to
larger banks creates concerns for the larger banks that have been, on the
whole, unwilling to engage with this growing industry.66
Significantly, of the financial institutions that have elected to
provide services to marijuana-related businesses, none have yet been
subjected to any enforcement actions.67 As of August 12, 2014,
however, only 105 U.S. financial institutions provided banking services
to state-sanctioned marijuana businesses.68 These 105 financial
institutions represent less than 1% of all banks and credit unions in the
United States.69 Despite the relative dearth of participation, FinCEN
maintains that the agency’s guidance accomplishes its purported aims
by “facilitating access to financial services, while ensuring that this
activity is transparent and the funds are going into regulated financial
institutions.”70 Whatever FinCEN’s position, the widespread reluctance
of banks indicates that the industry does not share the sentiment that the
guidance is “facilitating access to financial services.”
IV. SUSPICIOUS, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS
The FinCEN guidance provides a regulatory structure for banks
that do choose to establish business relationships with marijuana

http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/2014/10/18/new-banking-rules-create-tough-barriersfor-states-growing-medical-pot-business-a-569267.html#.VNYNjIupX8E (quoting Brian
Kindle) (“[S]everal months later, the effect of that guidance remains hazy. Comments by
FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery indicate that while a small handful of institutions
are providing services to the legal marijuana industry, many others have terminated
relationships with customers tied to the marijuana trade.”).
65. Wolf, supra note 40.
66. Id.
67. Or, at least, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, FinCEN Director, “was unaware” of any such
prosecutions. Kovaleski, supra note 37.
68. Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks to
Mid-Atlantic AML Conference (Aug. 12, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/html/20140812.html).
69. Editorial, Marijuana Dispensaries Need Access to Banking System, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2014, at A12.
70. Calvery, Remarks to Mid-Atlantic AML Conference, supra note 68.

2015]

MARIJUANA GUIDANCE TO BANKS

175

businesses.71 If the deprioritization of federal prosecution does not
deter banks from offering their services, they may be dissuaded by the
regulatory structure itself. The structure included in the FinCEN
guidance enumerates processes related to “customer due diligence” and
the issuing of “Suspicious Activity Reports” (“SARs”).72 These
processes place major burdens on banks in addition to the already
disconcerting lack of assurance against prosecution.73
The FinCEN guidance requires that all banks first conduct
“customer due diligence” before entering into any specific business
relationship with a marijuana vendor. “Due diligence” includes:
(i) verifying with the appropriate state authorities
whether the business is duly licensed and registered; (ii)
reviewing the license application (and related
documentation) submitted by the business for obtaining
a state license to operate its marijuana-related business;
(iii) requesting from state licensing and enforcement
authorities available information about the business and
related parties; (iv) developing an understanding of the
normal and expected activity for the business, including
the types of products to be sold and the type of
customers to be served (e.g., medical versus recreational
customers); (v) ongoing monitoring of publicly available
sources for adverse information about the business and
related parties; (vi) ongoing monitoring for suspicious
activity, including for any of the red flags described in
this guidance; and (vii) refreshing information obtained
as part of customer due diligence on a periodic basis and
commensurate with the risk.74
FinCEN then asks banks to continue to monitor these clients and
to use their judgment as to whether or not a client has violated one of
the “Cole Memo Priorities.”75

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 2.
Id.
Hill, supra note 23, at 15–16.
FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 2.
Id.; see also supra Part III.
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After moving through the process of “customer due diligence”
and choosing to accept a customer account from a state-sanctioned
marijuana business, a bank must then follow a process of filing SARs
that applies regardless of the client’s compliance with the Cole Memo
Priorities.76 “The obligation to file a SAR is unaffected by any state law
that legalizes marijuana-related activity.”77 A financial institution is
required to file a SAR if, consistent with FinCEN regulations, the
financial institution “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect” that any
transaction involves proceeds from activity that the federal government
designates as illegal, attempts to avoid liability by misrepresenting the
source of such funds, is “designed to evade” BSA regulations or “lacks
a business or apparent lawful purpose.”78
The FinCEN regulatory scheme and federal law still treat
marijuana-related activity as an illegal source of funds.79 Therefore, any
financial institution beginning a relationship with a marijuana-related
business must immediately file a “Marijuana Limited Suspicious
Activity Report,” even if the relationship implicates none of the Cole
Memo Priorities and the marijuana-related business has undergone the
scrutiny of customer due diligence.80 These Marijuana Limited SARs
identify the parties involved and state that the “filing institution is filing
the [Marijuana Limited Suspicious Activity Report] solely because the
subject is engaged in a marijuana-related business.”81 These Marijuana
Limited SARs also require a bank’s assurance that “no additional
suspicious activity has been identified,” beyond the fact that marijuana
is involved.82
After the initial SAR, FinCEN requires banks to file “continuing
activity reports.”83 These reports, in addition to the information
contained in the Marijuana Limited SARs, contain the amounts of
deposits, withdrawals and transfers made by the account since the last
SAR filing.84 The filing of “continuing activity reports” is an obligation
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 3..
Id.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012).
FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of ongoing “customer due diligence.”85 A “continuing activity report”
must be filed within 120 days of the initial filing, and continue under
that same timeframe.86 This will result in three “continuing activity
report[s]” in a twelve-month period.87
Conducting customer due diligence requires continued
monitoring for “red flags.”88 The February FinCEN Guidance includes
a non-exhaustive list of actions constituting “red flags.”89 If, in the
course of conducting customer due diligence, an institution detects a
possible violation of one of the Cole Memo Priorities, the institution
must file a “Marijuana Priority” SAR.90 A SAR of this kind must
contain “comprehensive detail.”91 The FinCEN Guidance notes the
following as relevant details to law enforcement includable in a
“Marijuana Priority” SAR: the identifying information and addresses of
the subject and “related parties, details and descriptions” of those
policies which the financial institution suspects have violated, and dates,
amounts and “other relevant details” of the financial transactions.92
Finally, if a bank wishes to terminate a relationship with a marijuanarelated business, it must file a “Marijuana Termination SAR” to indicate
that it has done so in order to remain compliant with the relevant
regulatory statutes.93
Thus, if a depository institution wishes to enter into a
relationship with a legitimate marijuana-related business, it must
perform extensive background checks into the proposed client.94 The
institution must closely monitor the client’s activity on a continuing
basis while continually filing SARs concerning the business’ financial

Id.
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the FinCEN Suspicious Activity Report,
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/whatsnew/html/sar_faqs.html
(question #16) (providing guidance on the filing timeframe for submitting a continuing
activity report).
87. Id.
88. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 5.
89. For example, “[t]he business is unable to demonstrate that its revenue is derived
exclusively from the sale of marijuana in compliance with state law, as opposed to revenue
derived from (i) the sale of other illicit drugs, (ii) the sale of marijuana not in compliance
with state law, or (iii) other illegal activity.” Id.
90. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 4.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 4–5.
94. Id. at 2.
85.
86.
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transactions.95 The SARs must also include what those transactions
may indicate.96 If any indication comes to the bank’s attention that
might suggest the violation of a prosecutorial priority, the bank must
immediately terminate its relationship with that client.97 A misstep in
any part of this process could incur significant penalties, including
exposing the bank to the possibility of prosecution.98 Clearly, this
extensive burden would not appeal to a financial institution.
The SAR process is also full of bureaucratic redundancies. If
the SAR process, as implemented, actually means to deter banks from
supporting businesses that implicate one of the
enumerated
prosecutorial priorities, the initial SAR filing is not essential to that end.
If banks are charged with the ongoing monitoring and customer “due
diligence,” and are required to notify the government at the first sign of
possible infraction, the initial filing appears to serve no other purpose
than to keep a registry for possible prosecution should FinCEN decide
that it wishes to change its stance on deprioritization. The effect of the
current system has chilled banking of marijuana businesses, because the
federal government still views this activity as criminal.99 Even without
actions violative of the emphasized prosecutorial priorities issued by
FinCEN, the guidance implies that banks’ relationships with these
businesses are “suspicious” by nature.100 The banks, in turn, have
responded by becoming “suspicious” of their ability to extend services
to these businesses unencumbered by the possibility of imminent
prosecution.101
Furthermore, the onerous requirements for continued monitoring
and filing of the baseline SARs are unnecessary in light of the
provisions for “red flag” conduct. If the marijuana-related business
raises an issue that appears relevant to the prosecutorial priorities that
FinCEN has emphasized, then a report must be filed.102 However, a
constant stream of monitoring in the absence of such “red flags” is

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.
See Nelson, supra note 41.
FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 3.
See Stephens, supra note 11.
Id.
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burdensome.103 Requiring banks to follow such ponderous procedures
does not more efficiently detect marijuana-related businesses that do
implicate the Cole Memo Priorities. Additionally, requiring these
procedures does not increase the probability of detecting marijuanarelated businesses that run afoul of the priorities that the government
has a particularized interest in protecting. If the initial SAR and the
continued submission of “Marijuana Limited” SARs were removed
from the monitoring scheme and the “Marijuana Priority” and
“Marijuana Termination” SARs remained, it might provide banks with
more flexibility to enter into these relationships. If the regulatory
scheme could be streamlined, it would not deprive the government of its
right to prosecute those businesses operating outside of legitimate
boundaries.104 Customer due diligence would, of course, still be
required, but at a more manageable, less arbitrary level. The inclusion
of these other procedures sets such a high regulatory bar that banks are
sharply deterred from participating in relationships with marijuana
businesses.105
Regulators and lawmakers must afford stronger protections to
banks in providing services to the marijuana industry, or the SAR
process must be severely truncated, or both. Without either of these
reforms, banks will continue to feel that they are being shortlisted for
prosecution by providing lists of “adverse” clients beyond the normal
financial regulatory protocols.106 Ultimately, legislation may be the
only firm solution to the trepidation that financial institutions feel in
dealing with marijuana businesses.107 In the meantime, the softening of
the regulatory protocols contained in the FinCEN guidance could ease
some of the banks’ anxieties, but such protocol changes are still subject

Brown et al., supra note 7.
See Hill, supra note 23, at 18 (quoting FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 9, 63–65 (2010)
(“For example, a person, including a bank employee, willfully violating the [BSA] or its
implementing regulations is subject to a criminal fine of up to $250,000 or five years, or
both.”).
105. See Hill, supra note 23, at 46 (“[F]ederal financial regulators must set achievable
due diligence expectations for banks offering services to the marijuana industry. If federal
regulators unreasonably require financial institutions to police marijuana businesses’
compliance with all federal and state law, institutions will continue to avoid the marijuana
industry.”).
106. Stephens, supra note 11.
107. Nelson, supra note 41.
103.
104.
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to the possibility of quick turnover.108 This Note does not claim that
there are no legitimate reasons for banks to provide information in cases
where a reasonable cause for concern arises. Instead, it advocates for a
compromise between sweeping permissiveness and cumbersome
limitations that brand any such relationships as prima facie “suspicious”
in nature.
Even if additional protections and reduced SAR reporting
materialize, larger financial institutions will likely still remain
unconvinced to open their doors to marijuana businesses.109 The
American Bankers Association (the “Association”), for example, has
said that the problems inherent in the fundamental prohibition cannot be
ameliorated by guidance alone.110 The Association did indicate that
further and friendlier guidance might help to change the positions of
banks, but that guidance remains subject to immediate change and, thus,
cannot provide lasting assurance.111 While regulatory changes might
provide some basis for movement on the issue, the only way that banks
will feel completely shielded from the possibility of imminent
prosecution is by a substantive change in the law.112
Nonetheless, some modifications could ease the transition from
total prohibition to the opening up of a burgeoning commercial market.
As Congress inches toward aligning itself with the majority of
Americans who support legalization of marijuana, there are several
proposals under legislative consideration.113
Coupled with an
enervation of the stringency of the protocols outlined by FinCEN to
remain consonant with the BSA and the relevant money laundering
statutes, we could see a change in the hardline attitude the major banks
have so far adopted toward conducting business with the marijuana
industry. Legislative change is the Holy Grail for financial institutions
to feel secure enough to offer services to the marijuana industry.114
Until then, a softening of the FinCEN guidance could move

Id.
See id. (quoting Grossman, supra note 109).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, H.R. 2652, 113th Cong.
(2013); Financial Services and General Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 5016, H.Amdt.
1086, 113th Cong. (2014); see also infra Part IV.
114. See Nelson, supra note 41 (quoting Grossman, supra note 109).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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significantly in that direction.115
V. CRIMINALS PREFER CASH, BUT MAY ACCEPT CREDIT UNIONS
Without access to depository institutions and banking services,
the marijuana industry is largely an all-cash business.116 All-cash
income streams inevitably attract criminal activity, make state and
federal tax enforcement difficult, and leave revenue and commodities
produced by the industry outside of the larger marketplace where they
could serve to foster economic viability on a greater scale.117 Though
the businesses themselves operate legally at the state level, the
unavailability of financial services forces many manufacturers and
business owners to provide security for their own profits.118 Their cash
is often stored in warehouses, in private residences, or on the business’
premises where it is secured only by conventional means available to
the general public.119 A lack of access to the security of depository
institutions forces some state-approved marijuana businesses to hire
private security firms and to charter armored trucks to transport the
large amounts of cash accrued by their operations.120 With cash on
hand, and limited options available for its secure storage, state-approved
marijuana businesses are left vulnerable to theft, extortion, harassment,
and substantially increased overhead.121 A lack of access to depository
institutions also keeps the cash generated by marijuana-related activities
from working as a more lucrative investment vehicle and makes
accurate collection of tax more difficult.122
In the absence of large-scale commercial financial services,
some states that have legalized marijuana-related businesses have
See id.
Stephens, supra note 11.
Ferner, supra note 29.
Stephens, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
See id. (illustrating the difficulties of a particular business owner, Elliot Klug, “One
upshot: Cash remains king for Klug’s business, a situation that heightens the risk level. He
said one bank has approached him about providing services, but insisted that only armored
cars could transport his cash and his products and that wouldn’t be covered by the proposed
$1,500 monthly service fee.”).
122. See Jacob Sullum, Marijuana Money Is Still a Pot of Trouble for Banks, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/09/18/local-banks-terrifiedby-friendly-neighborhood-marijuana-merchants/.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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proposed state legislation that permits the use of financial
cooperatives.123 These would essentially function as credit unions.124
But even these measures are fraught with complications. One major
complication is that the Federal Reserve would have to permit such
financial cooperatives to accept credit cards and checks.125
Under the Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act (“Coop Act”) passed May 7, 2014, by the Colorado Senate, the financial
cooperatives would operate in a manner similar to credit unions.126 The
co-ops, however, would not have a deposit insurance requirement and
would be governed by the state’s financial services commissioner.127
The financial cooperatives will be run by the co-op members and
supervised by the state.128 While improving upon mass hoarding and
transporting of physical cash, without the security offered by deposit
insurance, such cooperatives might find themselves in the crosshairs of
instability. Deposit insurance protects depositors in the event of a
bank’s failure.129 If the co-op were to fail, members’ deposits would not
be protected in the same way.130 Without the safety net of deposit
insurance, the “cannabis co-ops” mitigate only some of the problems
associated with the “all-cash” nature of the current marijuana
industry.131
There are restrictions in place, peculiar to these so-called
“cannabis co-ops” under the Co-op Act, that do little to mitigate the
problems experienced by marijuana businesses in attaining financial
services.132 First, incorporators of the co-ops, under the Colorado
legislation, must provide the state financial services commissioner with
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Coffman, supra note 16.
Id.
Stephens, supra note 11.
Coffman, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
FDIC Mission, Vision and Values, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
130. At least, not with the substantial guarantees of the FDIC or NCUA. They might
seek private insurance, but it would not fall under the purview of the national government.
131. See Coffman, supra note 16.
132. Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act, H.R. 14-1398 § 11-33-104(4)(a),
69th Leg. (Co. 2014) (“Before the commencement of operations or the conduct of business
by the co-op, the incorporators of the co-op must provide to the commissioner written
evidence of approval by the federal reserve system board of governors for access by the coop to the federal reserve system in connection with the proposed depository activities of the
co-op.”).
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written evidence of approval by the Federal Reserve Bank for access to
the Federal Reserve System.133 Second, the bill states that, while
subjected to taxation and outside of the protection of the FDIC, the
“cannabis co-op” must “comply with all applicable requirements of
federal law,” “file suspicious activity reports,” “conduct due diligence,”
and “establish a customer identification policy.”134 In other words, the
procedures, restrictions and flimsy protections offered by the FinCEN
guidance apply with equal vigor to these “co-ops” despite the lack of an
insurance benefit. Additionally, these co-ops are designated specifically
to provide services to businesses that the federal government views as
adverse clients supplying ill-gotten gains.135 If the political winds were
to shift, these co-ops could be targets for prosecution and penalties. The
so-called “cannabis credit co-op” must first apply to submit to the
purview of the Federal Reserve System.136 Then the co-op must remain
restricted by the very procedures that deter the banks from conducting
the business they seek to conduct. Finally, co-ops must do all of this
without many of the benefits offered by the infrastructure of a
conventional depository institution.
The powers of these co-ops are briefly outlined as follows: (1)
to make loans to its members and other co-ops; (2) to make deposits in
other state or national financial institutions that voluntarily accepts
those deposits; (3) to invest in obligations or securities guaranteed or
insured by an agency of the United States, obligations of any state or
territory of the United States, in shares of mutual funds or investment
companies, stocks, bonds or other securities; (4) to acquire, through
purchase or other lawful transactions, and hold the title to real and
personal property; (5) to exercise such incidental powers as are
necessary to enable it to carry on effectively the business for which it is
incorporated; (6) to sell its own assets and purchase the assets of
another co-op; and (7) to participate with other co-ops or financial
organizations in making loans to co-op members.137
On its face, the notion of a cannabis co-op sounds like precisely
the system that the state-sanctioned marijuana industry needs. It is a
133. Id.
134. Id. § 11-33-126.
135. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (categorizing

marijuana as illegal under federal law).
136. H.R. 14-1398, § 11-33-104(4)(a).
137. Id. § 11-33-107.
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starting point, but these powers are without much force on their own
because the deposits made in other state or national financial institutions
must be “voluntarily accept[ed].”138 Investments in shares of mutual
funds or investment companies face essentially the same
complication.139 Rather than circumventing the existing problems with
the regulatory structure, the co-op schema merely redoubles them under
a new, more specific banner.140 In order to participate in the larger
financial markets, these co-ops would have to place their funds in the
care of institutions that are unwilling to expose themselves to the
liabilities associated with ill-gotten gains. While the benefits associated
with access to loans, the facilitation of real property transactions and the
diversion of physical cash into limited credit availability will likely
alleviate some of the strain, the channeling of the proceeds of marijuana
businesses into real economic contribution to the markets is not satisfied
by these types of institutions. Without insurance or infrastructure, the
criminal depletion of funds from co-ops or the potential for isolated
panics are still very real concerns.
Most of the powers granted to these new financial entities by the
Co-op Act ring hollow and exacerbate a problem that the banks are
facing in dealing with smaller financial institutions that have accepted
funds from marijuana businesses.141 Specifically, larger financial
institutions are uncertain of their risk of liability in accepting funds from
smaller depository institutions,142 which would presumably include
“cannabis credit co-ops” that deal with the marijuana vendors directly.
For example, “if a marijuana business deposits money into an account at
a bank which then wires funds to pay for supplies such as soil, seeds, or
packaging, the banks handling the other side of the transactions need to
know if they risk charges for lapses in their anti-money laundering
programs, or even criminal money laundering.”143
The FinCEN guidance issued in February is conspicuously
unclear as to how to handle indirect activity.144 The guidance mentions
that the institutions “may file” a report with authorities and should make
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. § 11-33-107(1)(d).
Id. § 11-33-107(1)(e)(III).
Id.
The problem of handling indirectly linked accounts. Wolf, supra note 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“risk-based” decisions in determining whether or not to process such
transactions.145 Such language likely indicates that banks will continue
to avoid direct transactions with marijuana-related businesses as well as
indirect transactions with customers who are depositing money they
received from marijuana-related activity.146 The lack of clarity
concerning the problem of indirect banking relationships with marijuana
businesses presents not only further doubts as to the major institutions’
willingness to involve themselves but also to the extent of the efficacy
of institutions such as the Colorado “cannabis credit co-ops.” At
present, it is likely that such institutions’ powers will remain severely
limited. From the information available in the bill, it appears they will
be unable to accomplish much more than a diversion of cash into
truncated credit, housed by what are functionally credit unions subject
to the same federal guidelines as banks, but without the benefit of
deposit insurance.147
Without more substantial reforms, any
participation in the larger financial system—despite what the Colorado
legislation grants as “powers” to these co-ops—will be mostly titular.
VI. THE GRASS IS ALWAYS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE
BELTWAY
Amidst this gloomy forecast regarding the participation of
marijuana-related businesses in the financial system, there are some
legislative proposals currently under discussion. First is the Marijuana
Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, which would create the
blanket immunity that banking institutions are clamoring for to allow
them the security they need to conduct business with marijuana-related
enterprises.148 Second is the proposed Financial Services and General
Appropriations Act of 2015, which contains an amendment (the “Heck
Amendment”) that would “prohibit use of funds with respect to [states
with legalized marijuana], to penalize a financial institution solely
because the institution provides financial services to an entity that is a
manufacturer, producer, or a person that participates in any business or
Id.; see also FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9.
Wolf, supra note 40.
Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act, H.R. 14-1398 §§ 11-33-107, 1133-126, 69th Leg. (Co. 2014).
148. Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, H.R. 2652, 113th Cong.
(2013) (as introduced June 10, 2013).
145.
146.
147.
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organized activity that involves handling marijuana or marijuana
products.”149 The former has yet to move through committee or to see
the House floor.150 The latter passed the House and awaits Senate
approval.151 Finally, a bill was recently passed by both chambers of
Congress and signed by the President that severely limited the DOJ’s
power to prosecute state-sanctioned medical marijuana businesses, but
did little to address the complications involving the banks.152
One of the relevant provisions of the Marijuana Businesses
Access to Banking Act prohibits a federal banking regulator from
terminating or limiting the deposit insurance of a bank solely because
the institution provides financial services to a state-sanctioned
marijuana business.153 The Act also forbids federal regulators from
prohibiting, penalizing, or otherwise discouraging a depository
institution from providing services to a legitimate marijuana-related
business.154 Finally, the proposed bill prohibits regulators from
recommending, incentivizing or encouraging a bank or depository
institution to cancel or diminish the services offered to an individual
solely because the individual is a proprietor, manufacturer or producer
involved in a marijuana-related state-sanctioned business.155 Although
this bill provides precisely the kind of protections and guarantees
against civil and criminal liability the banking industry is demanding
before it is willing to engage meaningfully with the budding marijuana
market, it is unlikely to reach the President’s desk.156 The bill is over a
year old and has yet to make it through committee.157
More promising than the Marijuana Business Access to Banking
Act is the appropriations bill that has already passed the House of
149. Financial Services and General Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 5016, H.Amdt.
1086, 113th Cong. (2014).
150. H.R. 2652 (113th): Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2652 (last visited Oct. 5,
2014).
151. H.R. 2652.
152. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217.
153. H.R. 2652.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. GovTrack.us considers the bill to be dead. Previously, it gave the bill a 1% chance
of passage. GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2652 (last visited
Jan. 6, 2015).
157. Id.

2015]

MARIJUANA GUIDANCE TO BANKS

187

Representatives with the Heck Amendment.158 The Heck Amendment
denies the allocation of funds to the Treasury Department for the
purpose of penalizing financial institutions for dealing with statesanctioned marijuana businesses.159 While falling well short of
instituting any specific legal protections that would contradict the “dual
regime” structure of federal prohibition and state permission of the sale
of marijuana, it carries with it the implication of accomplishing a form
of protection de facto from federal penalties.160 Although the
appropriations bill does not prevent prosecution pursuant to the CSA by
the DOJ, it does limit the power of FinCEN and the Treasury
Department to pursue violations of the BSA and relevant federal money
laundering statutes.161 The discretion of these agencies to pursue these
violations is much broader and more meaningful without the limitations
on their funding imposed by the Heck Amendment.162 BSA violations
are, in large part, the area of greatest concern expressed by the banking
industry after the issuance of the February Guidance.163
If the appropriations bill is ultimately signed into law, retaining
the Heck Amendment in its current form, many of the questions raised
by the banking industry will have some more solid and favorable
answers. Obviously, the banking industry would prefer to see
something more akin to the full-scale immunity offered in the
Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act, but, in its absence, the
prohibition of a release of funds to pursue prosecutions by FinCEN
could result in a shift in the banks’ attitudes. Unfortunately, at the close
of the 113th Congress, neither the appropriations bill containing the
Heck Amendment, nor the Marijuana Access to Banking Act reached
the Senate, and at this point, appear to be ostensibly dead.164
Congress did pass a spending bill containing a provision

158. Financial Services and General Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 5016, H.Amdt.
1086, 113th Cong. (2014).
159. Id.
160. Mr. Heck explains, “I offer this bipartisan amendment to carry forth an important
issue of public safety to provide legally-constituted marijuana businesses access to banking
services. To do otherwise is to render them an all-cash sector of the economy, which is
fraught with peril.” Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Brown et al., supra note 7.
164. GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5016 (last visited Jan.
6, 2015).
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addressing marijuana prohibition, but it does not offer any substantive
clarification concerning the access to depository institutions by the
industry.165 The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations
Act of 2015, nicknamed the CRomnibus Act (a combination of
continuing resolution and omnibus spending bill) was signed into law
on December 16, 2014.166 CRomnibus prohibits the allocation of funds
to the DOJ for the purpose of prosecuting medical marijuana businesses
in states where it has been legalized.167 However, CRomnibus makes
no mention of marijuana legalized for recreational purposes, nor does it
contain any language specifically concerning financial crimes or
banking institutions.168 Where the Heck Amendment specifically
prohibited actions by FinCEN against banking institutions, CRomnibus
addresses the DOJ and prosecutions contradicting state law.169 It
remains to be seen if CRomnibus will be interpreted to prevent
prosecution of banking institutions that deal with medical marijuana
businesses. Even in such a scenario, CRomnibus will still have no
effect on the operations of the Treasury Department or FinCEN. It will
also need to be determined, by regulation or by the interpretation of the
courts, whether legal recreational marijuana businesses will also benefit
from the appropriations restrictions.170 Given the lack of direct
language, clarity will need to be established as the law is tested.171
While this outcome may be good news for marijuana-related
business owners who fear federal prosecution under the CSA, it does
little to address the concerns of the banking industry. There is a
possibility that CRomnibus could prevent the DOJ from prosecuting
banks under the CSA, but the BSA and anti-money laundering statutes
enforceable by the Treasury Department and the FinCEN remain
unrestricted.172
Regardless of how any of the relevant legislation unfolds,
additional procedural and regulatory changes to the SAR and customer
165. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The text of the bill makes no direct mention of recreational marijuana; its language
is confined to state-sanctioned “medical” marijuana. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
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due diligence procedures outlined by the FinCEN would also be
necessary.173 For instance, limiting the SAR process so that it is less
cumbersome, and providing more robust language in guidelines issued
by the DOJ and FinCEN could grant greater assurance to financial
institutions that they will not be prosecuted simply for doing business
with the marijuana industry, provided that there is not some further
violation under the CSA. However, changes to regulatory guidance
cannot possibly account for political shifts that could leave the banking
industry vulnerable again.174 Therefore, changes in federal guidance are
only short-term fixes to be used in the absence of new legislation or
until pending legislation is passed.175 The CRomnibus bill does not
address the core concerns of the banking industry, concerns that the
Heck Amendment might have alleviated.176 Likewise, even the Heck
Amendment only grappled with the purse strings of federal agencies,
and not the underlying problem of a fundamental conflict between state
and federal law.177
Statutory protections may open the floodgates allowing access
to financial services. However, neither the Heck Amendment, the
CRomnibus bill, nor the Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act
will be sufficient to curtail the problems inherent in a “dual regime”
system wherein all marijuana businesses are violative of federal law
even where the conduct has been legalized in the state.178 The
legislative changes may also fall short of alleviating the concerns banks
still may have about engaging in behavior that violates federal law.179
Until Congress is willing to address the legalization of marijuana, the
practical reality is that many businesses, sanctioned by state law, lack
access to financial services to avoid exacerbating the problems of a
black market.180 The federal government’s choice to place a “low

See supra Part III.
Nelson, supra note 41 (quoting Grossman, supra note 109).
Id.
128 Stat. at 2217; Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, H.R.
2652, 113th Cong. (2013) (as introduced Jun. 10, 2013).
177. Financial Services and General Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 5016, H.Amdt.
1086, 113th Cong. (2014).
178. Hill, supra note 23, at 6.
179. Nelson, supra note 41.
180. Kevin Wack, Banks ‘Loosen Up’ on Pot Business as FDIC Adopts FinCEN
Guidance, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 2014, at 2 (quoting James Pishue, president of Washington
Bankers Association, as saying, “[t]here really needs to be a federal solution to this.”).
173.
174.
175.
176.
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priority” status on prosecuting banking institutions that deal with the
state-sanctioned marijuana industry is given more meaning when the
purse strings are tightly closed as well. Beyond these specific
proposals, the larger legal problem with the “dual regime” may only be
finally resolved if marijuana is decriminalized at the federal level, or if
marijuana is decriminalized at the federal level in states that have
legalized marijuana.181 Without such a sea change, the legal landscape
will remain fraught with contradictions and the security of financial
institutions that choose to participate “at their own risk,” is dependent
upon the practical realities of underenforcement of federal law.182
Regulatory changes, rather than the mere issuance of tepid
“guidance” would also signal greater protections to banks that seek to
engage with the marijuana industry.183 A shift in funding, similar to that
offered by the Heck Amendment could prove to be enough of a
tourniquet to produce an elevation of participation, or it could prove to
be as lackluster of a solution as the FinCEN guidance has proven to be.
In the current environment of uncertainty, it will remain to be seen
whether banks’ eagerness to participate in an increasingly lucrative
market will outweigh their desire to avoid liability.
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